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2 June 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## DAILY BRIEF

**\*Dominican Republic:** The appearance of unity and stability being maintained by President Balaguer and the diverse elements that formed the government and the military and political machines of the late dictator is probably a facade. The rivalries and jealousies among Trujillo's underlings, which only occasionally came to the surface during his lifetime, are deepseated and almost certain to weaken the regime in the near future. While members of the Trujillo family and those high officers most intimately associated with the dead dictator now feel they have no recourse but to stand or fall together, other high officials, military as well as civilian, recognize the hostility to the Trujillo regime that has been engendered among important segments of the Dominican population. These officials may well become convinced that their future would be better served by an alliance with the anti-Trujillo dissident elements. The 31 years of Trujillo rule, however, have left a legacy that severely hampers any immediate transition toward democratic government.

The American Consulate reported on 1 June that the capital city is being patrolled by heavily armed military and police units and that the general attitude of the people there is a compound of suppressed excitement, fearful apprehension, and grim satisfaction that Trujillo is dead. The consul also notes that there has been a wave of panic buying of food in the capital. While reports of developments outside the capital are scanty, the consulate reports some indications of violence in the traditionally dissident interior region known as the Cibao.

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**International Reaction:** Bloc comment on the Trujillo assassination has been limited. A Moscow English-language broadcast on 1 June quoted the State Department announcement of the event and described the Trujillo regime as "a fascist dictatorship based on military force and the assistance extended to the

regime by the United States." The broadcast added that Trujillo had recently heightened repression of his opposition and had imprisoned thousands of persons.

Reaction in Latin America was generally one of satisfaction. A representative comment was that of Chilean Foreign Minister Ortuzar, who told newsmen that the assassination was a "natural end that awaits all dictators... who make a mockery of the rights and freedoms of man." In Haiti, the reaction was one of alarm as the government reinforced its border guards and mobilized the President's special militia. In Cuba, comment in the Castro-controlled press stressed the hope that the dictator's death would mean the "liberation" of the Dominican people, who now have "a magnificent opportunity to recover their freedom." [redacted]

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In Venezuela, where President Betancourt was the target of an almost successful assassination attempt mounted by Trujillo last year, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously passed a resolution of solidarity with the Dominican people. President Betancourt told the American ambassador on 31 May that his government had set aside air and naval forces and is prepared to send troops to the Dominican Republic if coordinated hemisphere military action is requested to help in maintaining internal order there. A high-ranking Venezuelan intelligence officer confided to the American naval attaché on 31 May that he is working with the Venezuelan interior minister in an effort to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of Communists and "radicals" among the Dominican exiles living in Venezuela. He added that the Venezuelan Government is prepared to give assistance in the form of money and transportation to "desirable" Dominican exiles who want to return. [redacted]

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[Redacted]

Iran: An undersecretary of the Iranian Foreign Ministry has expressed to the American ambassador his serious concern over the growing neutralist sentiment and pressure for withdrawal from CENTO among influential Iranians. Members of Prime Minister Amini's government reportedly want the new regime to withdraw its public support for CENTO, but Amini and the Shah are holding firm.

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cording to the Swedish ambassador in Tehran, Soviet Ambassador Pegov recently said that the USSR would demand Iran's withdrawal from CENTO and the abrogation of the 1959 bilateral defense agreement with the US as a price for improving relations. Amini told the American ambassador, however, that Pegov had made no such demand in a conversation on 29 May.

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
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**USSR-UAR:** Moscow has followed up Khrushchev's reported criticism of Nasir last month to a UAR parliamentary delegation with a Pravda article on 31 May which attacks two UAR government-controlled newspapers for "slanderous statements" against the Soviet Union and socialism. Soviet leaders are apparently displeased by Nasir's suppression of local Communists, his recent moves toward improving relations with the US, and his initiative, together with Tito, in arranging the projected neutralist summit conference. Moscow has so far apparently confined itself to propaganda pressures. Regular Soviet military deliveries to the UAR are continuing

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South Africa: The failure of the three-day non-white general strike, called by the Communist-dominated National Action Council (NAC) to protest South Africa's accession to republic status on 31 May, is a further demonstration of the difficulties facing any attempt to organize a mass protest movement in the Union. In the view of the American Embassy, the efforts to get the strike under way were plagued by a lack of non-European unity and by African indifference to abstract issues such as the controversy over establishment of a republic. Moreover, the NAC's propaganda build-up gave the government ample time to build up its security forces and to arrest or restrict the activities of most of the strike leaders. In the near future, outbreaks are likely to be the spontaneous result of local grievances, aggravated by such factors as panic action on the part of police, rather than the outcome of nationwide calls for demonstrations.

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African Labor Conference: The pan-African labor conference held from 25 to 30 May in Casablanca confirmed the lack of unity among African trade union leaders, while providing fresh evidence of the determination of representatives from Ghana and Guinea to exert leadership and curtail Western influence in Africa. Pressure by these elements and the unwillingness of the conference chairman, Morocco's top labor leader, to permit the conference to fail completely resulted in the formal creation of an All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), whose member unions must disaffiliate from other international labor federations within ten months. This action, however, followed the withdrawal from the conference of nearly all affiliates of the Western-sponsored International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which represents dominant labor groups in East, Central, and North Africa. The permanent governing board of the AATUF has a preponderance of members from the radical "Casablanca group" of African states.

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Mexico: Communist-led student demonstrations, similar to those which followed the April landings in Cuba and led to violence in several Mexican cities, have broken out again in Puebla, about 74 miles southeast of Mexico City. A pro-Castro group, which has dominated the University of Puebla for at least a month and aroused strong church and other anti-Communist reaction, reportedly abandoned the administration buildings on 27 May--probably under pressure from the Lopez Mateos government. However, on 29 May the group issued a manifesto proclaiming "the Socialist Republic of Puebla" and announcing that this was "the first step" toward establishment of a "26th of July Movement" in Mexico.

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Pan-African Labor Federation Established

Controversy both on and off the floor over the affiliation issue was the dominant feature of the confused six-day meeting. Contrary to earlier indications of what their strategy would be, the representatives from Ghana and Guinea displayed no inclination as the conference progressed to moderate their insistence on a non-affiliation clause--a demand clearly aimed at the ICFTU. This stand was backed by Mali's labor organization. Spokesmen for most of the ICFTU affiliates, led by Tunisia's Ahmed Tlili and Kenya's Tom Mboya, fought for the right of "dual" affiliation.

In this situation, the leaders of the principal Algerian and Moroccan unions, who share the neutralist outlook of the Ghanaians and Guineans on most other issues but wish to preserve their ICFTU ties, made strenuous efforts to develop a compromise formula. When this proved impossible, Morocco's Mahjoub Ben Seddik, the chairman and dominant personality of the conference, allowed the Ghana-Guinea position, modified only by the provision of the ten-month "grace" period, to be written into the charter adopted "unanimously" by the rump session. The Algerians likewise associated themselves with the AATUF on this basis. Despite this decision, both Ben Seddik, who has demonstrated his opportunism in the past, and the leader of the Algerian union approached an ICFTU representative after the conference to request a "more dynamic" ICFTU program in Africa; Ben Seddik is also reported to have told an African associate that he did not plan to disaffiliate his union from the ICFTU.

Ben Seddik appears to have circumscribed somewhat the ability of the Ghanaians and Guineans to use the new organization to advance their pan-African ambitions by having Casablanca accepted as both the headquarters of the AATUF and the site of its next general conference. Moreover, he managed to secure for himself the key position of chairman of the AATUF's permanent secretariat. Other members named to this group are from Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, the UAR, Morocco,

and Kenya--Mboya having been included without his knowledge or permission at the insistence of Ben Seddik, who had endeavored earlier in the conference to associate himself with the Kenyan leader. Except for still dependent Kenya, the secretariat is thus made up exclusively of labor leaders from the six "Casablanca group" countries.

For the present, Ben Seddik appears to be in a position to exert paramount influence over the fledgling organization --a situation which is reportedly already distressing the leaders of Ghana and Guinea. Nevertheless, the mere existence of the AATUF on the terms accepted at least in principle by Ben Seddik represents a distinct gain for the Ghana-Guinea approach to pan-Africanism. It will be difficult for any of the approximately 20 African ICFTU affiliates, which are already sensitive to charges of being "stooges of imperialism" and saboteurs of African unity, to remain outside the AATUF.

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### Pro-Castro Demonstrations by Mexican Students

Mexican public universities, like those in most of Latin America, are "autonomous" or independent of direct government control, and students take frequent advantage of this wide latitude for irresponsible political activity. In this setting, Communist-led minorities have become powerful in several Mexican universities. Known Communists from the University of Michoacan led a mob which on 17 April destroyed the cultural institute in Morelia sponsored by the Mexican and United States governments. The Mexican Government is investigating reports that at least one of the students was with Soviet Embassy officials in Morelia on 16 April. Demonstrations in Mexico City in late April--at which fellow-traveling former President Lazaro Cardenas exhorted the crowd to active support of Castro--were organized by Communist and leftist students at the National University.

There has been little evidence of Communist influence at the University of Puebla until recently, when radical students capitalized on an internal struggle over the choice of a rector and over university "reforms." After a long strike and destructive attacks by armed students on the more moderate colleges within the university, the leftists succeeded on 9 May in electing a rector and in obtaining almost all their demands for other changes. Local authorities evidently continued to recognize the former rector, a moderate, and the leftists barricaded themselves in certain university buildings, declaring their candidate to be the rector. Business and Catholic Action organizations have staged counterdemonstrations against the agitators, and one student group has charged that the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City supports and controls the leftists. Several anti-Communist groups have petitioned President Lopez Mateos for federal intervention.

The Mexican Government seldom acts against student demonstrations unless serious violence threatens, and Lopez Mateos is particularly averse to the use of force so close to congressional elections scheduled for July. However, the earlier concessions have evidently emboldened the Puebla agitators. Their

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reported withdrawal from the university and the governor of Puebla's refusal to allow their demonstration on 29 May probably animated their propaganda attacks on the Catholic Church and the army and their threats of a Castro-like revolt.

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